.Nw.ODMy: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "And ye Anathemis of yt creed must be understood not of those yt doe not conceive aright of ye diff'rences of nature & person in yt Trinity or of ye essential &personal attribu...") |
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then ye Father must be Son & H G: & ye Son & H G must be the Js also | then ye Father must be Son & H G: & ye Son & H G must be the Js also | ||
they are really ye same & really distinct ye same in essences distinct | they are really ye same & really distinct ye same in essences distinct | ||
in persons ??? ye same and not ye same | in persons ??? ye same and not ye same qd implical-- | ||
A/ This Argumt is grounded on the Supposition That ye divine essense | A/ This Argumt is grounded on the Supposition That ye divine essense | ||
is no more capable of | is no more capable of communicating itself to 3 distinct persons, yn | ||
any created being is for ye reason of ye Axiom is ye created things | any created being is for ye reason of ye Axiom is ye created things | ||
by reason of their finite nature cannot diffuse or communicate yms | by reason of their finite nature cannot diffuse or communicate yms | ||
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divine nature, & this perfection being a peculiar property of ye Godhead | divine nature, & this perfection being a peculiar property of ye Godhead | ||
there is no paralel for it neither is it reasonable for ye Socinany to | there is no paralel for it neither is it reasonable for ye Socinany to | ||
send us to created beings for ye rules & measures of | send us to created beings for ye rules & measures of o[u]r s indgent. concer | ||
-ning a being acknowledged to be infinite Obj. But are one ye persons in | -ning a being acknowledged to be infinite Obj. But are one ye persons in | ||
-finite as well as ye nature? as therefor created beings take in ye whole | -finite as well as ye nature? as therefor created beings take in ye whole | ||
Revision as of 05:44, 20 July 2017
And ye Anathemis of yt creed must be understood not of those yt doe not conceive aright of ye diff'rences of nature & person in yt Trinity or of ye essential &personal attributes; but of those yt felt up in opposition to yt ye worsp of a mere creature as God or ye worship of more gods yn one: or of those who wilfully reject this Ar. to ye Xtian faith wr ? duly purpose to ym all which are guilty of a damning sin.
As to ye sd difficulty of Que? convenient on one &c:
The Socinians argue thus if ye js be God, ye Son God & ye H G God then ye Father must be Son & H G: & ye Son & H G must be the Js also they are really ye same & really distinct ye same in essences distinct in persons ??? ye same and not ye same qd implical-- A/ This Argumt is grounded on the Supposition That ye divine essense is no more capable of communicating itself to 3 distinct persons, yn any created being is for ye reason of ye Axiom is ye created things by reason of their finite nature cannot diffuse or communicate yms to more yn & therefor those wch agree in a 3d must agree to ye then, but if it were possible yt ye same finite nature cd extend its to several individuals, then it wd be said yt ye Axiom holds only where they did and equitably & reciprocally agree, & not where they agreed only in essence but differ'd in manner of substances, for where a diff'rent manner of substances is suppos'd possible in ye same indivi -dual nature, ye agreemt in yt cannot take away ye diff'rences ? consistent wth it, wch wee attribute to ye unlimitednes & perfection of ye divine nature, & this perfection being a peculiar property of ye Godhead there is no paralel for it neither is it reasonable for ye Socinany to send us to created beings for ye rules & measures of o[u]r s indgent. concer -ning a being acknowledged to be infinite Obj. But are one ye persons in -finite as well as ye nature? as therefor created beings take in ye whole nature to infinite persons must take in ye infinite nature A/ The persons are infinite in regard of ye nature wch is so but if an infinite nature be communicable to more persons than one, every such person can- not appropriate ye whole nature to itself Obj. if ye diff'rences be, on ye account of infinity then there must be an infinite