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imported>Kitsapian (Created page with "determined by the civilized, not by the savage communities." He seems, thus, to take it for granted that the Supreme Court had, in the case of Johnson & McIntosh, left the qu...") |
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determined by the civilized, not by the savage communities." He seems, thus, to take it for granted that the Supreme Court had, in the case of Johnson & McIntosh, left the question open as to the extent of sovreignty acquired by the right of discovery over the Indians. But the Supreme Court did not leave it open; on the contrary, so far as the present controversy is concerned, it was completely closed by the principles established in that hitherto uncontroverted case. They say (page 573-4) "Those relations which were to exist between the discoverers & the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose." | determined by the civilized, not by the savage communities." He seems, thus, to take it for granted that the Supreme Court had, in the case of Johnson & McIntosh, left the question open as to the extent of sovreignty acquired by the right of discovery over the Indians. But the Supreme Court did not leave it open; on the contrary, so far as the present controversy is concerned, it was completely closed by the principles established in that hitherto uncontroverted case. They say (page 573-4) "Those relations which were to exist between the discoverers & the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose." "In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, disregarded, but were, necessarily, to a considerable extent impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a l nations, were necessarily diminished, and the power legal as well as just claim to retain the possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion: but their rights to complete sovreignty as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and the power to dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. In a subsequent page of the same case, (593) the court says-- "The title of the crown could be acquired only by a conveyance from the crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title. Admitting their power to change their laws or usages so far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the common stick, and hold it in severalty, still it is part of their territory and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and if they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who purchased land from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased, holds their title under their protection and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise & set aside the proceeding. Let |
Latest revision as of 13:43, 25 July 2020
determined by the civilized, not by the savage communities." He seems, thus, to take it for granted that the Supreme Court had, in the case of Johnson & McIntosh, left the question open as to the extent of sovreignty acquired by the right of discovery over the Indians. But the Supreme Court did not leave it open; on the contrary, so far as the present controversy is concerned, it was completely closed by the principles established in that hitherto uncontroverted case. They say (page 573-4) "Those relations which were to exist between the discoverers & the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose." "In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, disregarded, but were, necessarily, to a considerable extent impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a l nations, were necessarily diminished, and the power legal as well as just claim to retain the possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion: but their rights to complete sovreignty as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and the power to dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. In a subsequent page of the same case, (593) the court says-- "The title of the crown could be acquired only by a conveyance from the crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title. Admitting their power to change their laws or usages so far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the common stick, and hold it in severalty, still it is part of their territory and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and if they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who purchased land from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased, holds their title under their protection and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise & set aside the proceeding. Let